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I. Introduction   
 
 Industry  observers
1 assert that the quality of beef products has declined in relative 
terms to non-beef meat products, such as chicken or pork, over the last 30 years and that 
this decline has caused the steady erosion of beef demand since the late 1970’s.  Over this 
period beef’s share of the overall meat market fell from 48% of the total meat market in 
1976 to 32% of the meat market in 1998.  Similarly, beef inventories fell from 45 million 
head to below 33 million head.  Tables 1 and 2 depict the relative decline of beef in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of total meat production over this period. 
  Industry observers assert that the current pricing and generic market structure of 
beef products does not adequately convey important product quality information to 
consumers. Boland and Schroeder (July 2000) write "at the present time, there is no 
value-based marketing program that provides economic incentives for producers and 
processors to market more tender beef primal cuts to consumers.  Rapid and accurate 
measurement of tenderness is needed to implement a value-based marketing program.” 
Evidence has accumulated that the USDA grading standards poorly measure palatability 
and tenderness characteristics of beef.  Several branded beef programs have emerged that 
may fill the void of the perceived inadequacies of the USDA beef grading program.  The 
beef industry then faces both supply side and demand side problems. The supply side 
problem involves creating institutional arrangements that ensure that specified quality 
levels are produced in the parameters of the brand.  The demand side problem involves 
creating a creating a product sufficiently matched to consumer preferences to raise prices.  
This paper presents a model for bounding the effect of grading errors on price.   
Unlike previous studies of grading errors in agricultural markets, this method utilizes the   3 
fact that consumers purchasing higher quality types have revealed themselves as having 
higher marginal valuation of quality.  The Spence model of market separation with 
vertically differentiated products informs us that market separation occurs if the single-
crossing property is satisfied.  When market separation occurs, the value of two identical 
is different between consumers who have chosen separate products.   For this reason, 
methods that measure the effect grading errors on price are incorrect if they treat price as 
merely a linear combination of utility values from a single utility function.   
As programs of testing and grading which reduce grading error in the beef 
industry, this method may be used to estimate the relative benefits of these programs.  
 
II.  Overview of the Beef Industry 
II.A.  Production Process  
Production of beef involves distinct links in the supply chain--ranching, feeding 
and packing.  Ranchers regulate optimal herd size, feed the cattle and select the genetic 
makeup of the herd.  Feedlots then purchase the cattle from the ranchers at auction at 
around the age of 18 months and prepare the cattle for slaughter by altering the animal’s 
diet to have them add weight. The feeder decides when and to which meatpackers the 
cattle are sold. The meatpacker slaughters the animal and sells it as boxed beef to either a 
supermarket or a restaurant. 
Beef production has been a very diffuse industry at the ranching stage, more 
concentrated at the feedlot stage, and very concentrated at the packing and slaughtering 
stage.   For example, in 2001, there were approximately 840,000 ranching operations 
with a total inventory of approximately 33,400,000.  Moreover, approximately 60% of all 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1 Purcell (1999), Schroeder, Ward, Minnert and Peel (1998), and Lamb and Breshear (1998)   4 
beef cattle are raised on ranches of less than 500 head.  Alternatively, feedlots have been 
concentrating steadily since the 1970’s.  In 1995, there were 41,400 feedlots in the 12 
major cattle feeding state with 65% of fed lots having capacities exceeding 16,000 head.  
Beef packing firms are very concentrated with the top four firms servicing about 80 
percent of the market.   
Economies of scale are limited at the ranch level due to the unique features of 
cattle production.  Whereas swine and poultry can be fed corn and grain mixes 
throughout their lives in high-density feeding areas, cows are distinguished by their 
ability to feed on otherwise unproductive grassland through rumination.  For this reason, 
cattle production is land intensive at the ranch stage so that the number of cattle that can 
be managed on any single ranch is small relative to the market.  Once cattle are moved to 
the feedlots, cattle are concentrated in smaller areas as food sources are imported for the 
fattening process.  Finally beef packing exhibits large economies of scale as modern 
slaughter facilities are large-scale operations with high fixed costs.  As a result most beef 
packing facilities contract with feedlots and ranchers for future delivery to ensure that the 
plant operates near peak capacity.  
 
II.B History 
  In 1927, the first concerted effort at improved beef quality assurance began with 
the introduction of the USDA beef-grading program as a one-year experimental program.  
It has continued on a voluntary basis ever since.  In 1946, the Agricultural Marketing 
Service Act required that the USDA provide grading services to any group upon request 
and despite adjustments in terminology and individual grade requirements, the program 
has remained basically unchanged from its original format.    5 
   The USDA grading service assigns two grades to beef, a yield grade and a quality 
grade.  Assigning a quality grade consists of assessing two characteristics of the cattle 
carcass---maturity, by evaluating the shape and ossification of bones and cartilage and the 
color and texture of the flesh, and marbling, by examining the amount of fat dispersed 
through the meat itself. Based on these assessments, the USDA assigns the meat to one of 
eight quality grades (Prime, Choice, Select, Standard, Commercial, Utility, Cutter, and 
Canner) but only the Choice and Select grades are typically transacted in consumer 
markets.  Prime graded meat typically goes to upscale restaurants whereas lower graded 
meat is processed into soups, sausage or, at the lowest level, pet food.  Sorting tends to be 
relatively consistent as the USDA reports a 95% agreement rate between independent 
evaluations. 
In the post WWII era, transportation and refrigeration improvement allowed 
supermarkets to supplant traditional meat markets.  As supermarkets had organized 
themselves primarily as resale outlets for finished food goods, they sought to minimize 
their roles as meat processors.  Starting with Iowa Beef Packers (IBP) in the 1960’s, meat 
packers began shipping “boxed beef” where the carcass is divided and packed into boxes 
before it is shipped.   Furthermore, reductions in transportation and refrigeration costs 
allowed meatpacking plants to move closer to feedlots to avoid the costs of shipping live 
cattle to slaughter facilities.  In 1971, the Union Stockyards, the most visible symbol of 
the era of distant packing, closed after 106 years of operation. 
The post-war trends in agricultural market of expanding demand, deepening 
market integration, and standardization of products were also readily apparent in the beef 
industry. The availability of cheap fossil fuels and surplus grain allowed producers to use 
feedlots more extensively to increase weights and yields of cattle in the finishing process.     6 
Corn feeding also raised the amount of marbling in beef and substantially improved the 
chances of an animal earning a higher USDA grade. 
  Significant developments in animal husbandry would increase yields but, also 
possibly, influence the quality of consumer meat on the market.   In 1952, the first 
successful breeding occurred using frozen semen and by 1960 artificial insemination was 
being emphasize by AI studs.
2    In this time period, new herd associations arose and 
several new breeds were being introduced into the United States from abroad (see Table 
5.)   Mixed breeds became more common as breeders were able increase yields and feed 
conversion ratios by combining the traits of several breeds.   Through the mid-1970’s 
cattle breeding, a relatively market, soared through the mid-1970’s.  
The emergence of hybrid breeds (Beefmaster, Brangus) that mixed characteristics 
of European (Bos Taurus) and exotic (Bos Indicus, zebu-type) animals, however, may 
have been responsible for the decline in beef tenderness on average across the industry.   
While hybrid breeds may perform adequately within a USDA grading system that is 
primarily based on the amount of marbling in beef, evidence shows that these breeds are 
less tender than the European breeds
3 and that less than 10% of the variation in 
tenderness is explained by marbling.
4  As Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) document, if 
two desirable traits (tenderness and yield) are negatively correlated but only one trait 
(yield) has a market incentive, then the trait with the incentive crowds out the trait with 
no incentive. 
 By the end of the 1970’s, the 30-year trend of increasing beef demand had ended.   
Real beef prices began falling steadily along with cattle inventories through the late 
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3 Crouse et al., 1987 and 1989; Wheeler et al, 1994. 
4 Pearson,1966; Parrish, 1974; Jeremiah, 1978; Wheeler et al, 1994.  Look up later.    7 
1990’s.  Since 1976, both the pork and the beef industry have lost market share relative to 
a booming poultry industry (See Tables 1 and 2).   This fall has been explained in several 
ways including the relative decline in price of chicken compared with beef and other 
meat products, changes in consumer tastes, and health concerns.  Separate authors have 
emphasized that the beef industry has essentially remained a unprocessed commodity 
good in a market of increasingly differentiated, processed, consumer-oriented goods. The 
industry as a whole has not created new, more convenient products or substantially 
improved beef quality and consistency to reflect these demands. 
Certification programs have grown dramatically in an attempt by producers to 
separate out the consumer market for high-end consumers.  When in 1976 the USDA 
widened grading for prime and choice cuts, some producers believed that the grading 
system was weakening as a method of differentiating beef quality types.  In response, the 
American Angus Association established the Certified Angus Beef  (CAB) program in 
1978 in conjunction with the USDA.  Although this program was not widely adopted 
until 1994, it marked the first of 25 quality certification programs now administered by 
the USDA.     
In the meantime, as beef demand fell and cattle yields increased through the 
1980’s, the meatpacking industry consolidated in the midst of packing plant closures. 
Four firms, IBP, ConAgra (Excel), Cargill (Montfort), and National Beef, came to control 
80% of the market share of beef packing.   But, where the meat-packers of the earlier era 
have been viewed historically rent-seeking cartel, some economists today have 
speculated that the concentration of meat-packing may be beneficial to downstream 
suppliers as packer concentration facilitates coordination across supply links with regard 
to product innovation.   8 
 
II.C  Quality and Grading Overview 
Like most agricultural products, beef has been marketed as a commodity for most 
of its modern history and supermarket beef is typically neither branded nor traceable to 
its origin.  Information about the production process used to raise cattle is not easily 
recoverable.  Price variation across beef products is typically reducible to variation in 
cuts, grade and, with sometimes with regard to ground meat, fat content.    
Several authors in the meat science field have shown that the USDA grading 
standards do not identify significant variation in several valuable beef traits including, 
most notably, tenderness
5.  Savell et al (year) also find that USDA grade standards are 
ineffective at identifying meat tenderness.  Wheeler, Cundiff and Koch (1999) find that 
only 5% of the variation in palatability traits are explained by the degree of marbling in 
beef, the dominant USDA grading criterion.   Brooks et al (2000) corroborates Wheeler’s 
results in finding that the USDA grade had no effect on the Warner Bratzler Shear
6 
(WBS) force values of top loin steaks. Shackelford et al find that 89% of consumers 
would definitely or probably buy certified “tender select” beef if it were available at their 
local store.  Boleman et al found that approximately 95% of consumers are willing to 
purchase the highest tenderness level as offered as certified by the WBS method when 
offered to select from three products of increasing tenderness and price differentials of 
$1.10/ kg.  It is worth noting that while all of these studies support the underlying finding 
that consumers are will to pay more for more tender cuts of beef, all of the studies were 
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6 The Warner Bratzler Shear (WBS) Force test is method used to evaluate meat tenderness.  It involves 
measuring the force necessary to cut a cooked steak.  Obviously, this test is destructive of the final product 
and expensive to administer.   9 
conducted in non-market settings and are therefore open to long-running criticism of 
contingent valuation studies.  
Several authors within agricultural economics have shown that consumers exhibit 
a significant willingness to pay for beef that is certified to be higher quality.  Lusk et al 
found that 20% of consumers were willing to pay more than $2.67 over the cost of a 
comparable steak if it was certified as tender using the WBS method.  Overall, 51 percent 
were willing to pay a premium for steaks labeled “guaranteed tender" using this method.  
Similarly, Fuez and Umberger found that 29% of consumers were willing to pay $1.30 
more for an USDA Choice steak over an USDA Select steak.
7   
With such a clear market incentive for reasonable assured higher quality, 
producers have stepped in to fill the void.   “Branded” beef products have expanded 
through the creation of several USDA beef certification programs and process 
verification (PV) programs. Both types of programs are voluntary, producer-regulated 
and producer-financed.   The USDA’s role is to act as an independent intermediary who 
can credibly commit to impartiality in product evaluation according to the standards 
established by the program's members. 
USDA beef certification programs consist of USDA graders evaluating visible 
live animal and post-mortem carcass characteristics at a packing plant.   In the Certified 
Angus Beef (CAB) program, for example, graders first check to see if cattle meet the live 
requirement that the hide be 51% black, and that the cow be traceable back to registered 
Angus cattle, and that the hump be less than a specified size
8.   After slaughter graders 
then evaluate the carcass on several characteristics including hot carcass weight, ribeye 
area, and marbling.   The USDA requires that the cattle by presort at a packing plant at 
                                                        
7 There is more to this study but has not yet been published.   10 
the suggestion that 90% of presorted cattle eventually pass the certification process.  As 
separating cattle is costly to meat-packers, this target is generally adhered too.  
The USDA will certify cattle on any set of criterion provided to it.   Ownership of 
the brand name attached to the certification process, however, belongs to the developer of 
the certification program.  In the case of the CAB programs, only packers, fabricators, 
distributors, restaurants and retail stores licensed by the American Angus Association 
may use the CAB trademark.  Revenue from licensing is then used to promote the brand. 
 Currently, 25 programs are actively used while 41 certification program standards are on 
record. Most of active programs have been developed very recently (see Table 1.) 
The USDA Process Verification programs involve the USDA auditing the entire 
production process.  As there are only two active PV programs for the beef industry, 
patterns for successful programs are difficult to establish.  PV programs begin with the 
USDA getting a manual of operations detailing the criterion for the production process at 
each stage. USDA auditors then audits the ranches, feedlot, or packing plant to ensure the 
criterion is met.  Each audit typically takes one week annually.  The one-time process of 
adopting a new manual also takes about a week.   For example, the brand Your Own 
Beef  is verified under the PM Beef Group program.  In this program, three separate 
weeklong audits are conducted annually, in the feedlot, packing plant and cutting 
facilities respectively.  
 
III. Literature  Review 
Many agricultural products are sorted by quality before reaching the market.  
Cherries, prunes, shrimp, mussels, and olives are sorted by size.  Meats, including beef, 
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are graded by quality and priced accordingly.  Oranges, grapefruit, bananas, almonds, and 
onions may be branded so as to distinguish them as high quality from their commodity 
counterparts.  
Rosenman and Wilson (1991) empirically exam sorting under asymmetric 
information in their study of the cherry industry.  They find that when cherries are 
divided into three categories-- sorted high quality, sorted low quality and unsorted-- the 
price of unsorted cherries resides between the high quality and low quality prices 
reflecting the expectation that the average quality of the unsorted cherries is likely to be 
between the average qualities of the two sorted categories.  In Rosenman and Wilson 's 
model, firms are more likely to sort as the cost of sorting decreases, their proportion of 
high quality cherries increases, the difference between sorted high quality and low quality 
prices increases, and the difference between the unsorted price and the low quality price 
decreases.   
Hennessey (1996) argues that the information asymmetries over quality provide a 
reason for vertical integration between suppliers and retailers.  In his model, producers 
under-invest in quality-improving technology because retailers can not differentiate 
between good and bad quality products with certainty.   Non-vertically integrated 
retailers must test products to determine whether they are high or low quality.   Producers 
who have invested in quality improving technology have a higher proportion of output 
being of high quality than the non-invested producers do.  Non-integrated buyers test the 
product without knowing whether the producer from which they are buying have invested 
in quality improving technology.    Since testing is not completely accurate, the return to 
investing versus non-investing diminishes and fewer firms invest.  Alternatively, in a 
vertically integrated firm, testing is not required to determine the proportion of high   12 
quality.  Instead, the true change in proportion of high quality products is used to 
construct the incentive to invest, rather than the proportion that test as high quality.  
Henessey extends the model to the case where testing is costly but the results are 
essentially identical. 
Chalfant, James, Lavovie, and Sexton (CJLS) (1999) consider the price of effects 
of grading errors in the California prune industry.  In their model, prunes graded by size 
are subject to grading error, as undersized prunes are not always sorted out from large 
prunes in the sieving process. Containers of large prunes may contain some small prunes 
but not vice versa.  The authors model market prices for graded products as a linear 
combination of the underlying true values of a correctly graded product based on the 
probability of misgrading.  The paper then extrapolates the effect of asymmetric grading 
errors on the returns to producers by calculating the difference between the true value of 
a graded product and its price.   
(CJLS) specify that the price of a good is a probability-weighted average of the 
true market value of that each type of product.  If there are four quality types, then the 
value of a grade two good equals the probability of getting a type 1 good times the true 
market value of a type 1 good plus the probability of getting a type 2 good times the true 
market value of a type 2 good and so on.  If s1
2 represents the probability of a type one 
good being graded type two, V1 represents the true market value of type one, w1 equals 
the proportion of final output that is actually type 1, and m1equals the proportion of 
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A depiction of a utility function that could match this is depicted in Figure 3.     13 
This paper focuses on some potential inadequacies of the (CJLS) model in 
estimating the effects of grading error on prices from a consumer standpoint.  Whereas 
the CJLS paper is concerned mainly with the estimating effect of grading error on prices 
that producers receive, it is inadequate to address the potential effect on prices from a 
reduction in the likelihood of grading error since it treats the true market value of a 
graded good as constant.   In vertically differentiated product markets, consumers 
separate themselves based on the tastes for quality.   Market separation implies that 
consumers do not value identical products equally.  Different consumers will not treat the 
costs of grading errors the same. For this reason, higher value consumers suffer higher 
costs in being forced to take a low quality product than lower value consumers do. 
Importantly, as the probability of grading errors decrease neither the market shares nor 
the underlying market values will remain constant.   
The demand model presented below offers a way in to estimate the effect on 
prices from a reduction in grading error.  By estimating distribution of consumer taste 
preferences, one may specify the changes to prices that occur from a reduction in the 
frequency of grading errors.  
 
IV   Demand Models under Vertical Differentiation  
 
IV. A   Demand when Quality is Certain. 
  A simple model for consumer demand under vertical differentiation is taken from 
Tirole (1995). In this model, all consumers rank quality over identically over several 
products and quality is know with certainty but consumers differ in their willingness to 
pay for quality.  Consumers may select a product from a menu of several products with 
different prices and qualities.  Naturally, higher quality products have higher prices.    14 
 Let  Q equal a positive number that represents the quality of good and θ  equal a 
positive number that represents a consumer specific taste parameter for quality.  Across 
all consumers, θ  is distributed according to some distribution F(θ ) that has a positive 
support and consumers with larger θ ’s have a stronger preference for quality.  The 
consumer surplus function can be represented as a discrete choice between multiple 
products as: 
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Here, consumers simple pick the good that yields them the highest consumer surplus.   
Importantly, consumers who purchase a product reveal through their product selection 
that their individual θ  levels are constrained to fall with certain bounds where θ i is the 
minimum level of θ  that ensures a consumer still purchases that good (See Figure 4 for an 
illustration.) The distribution of consumers with specific θ  boundaries are defined by 
F(θ ).  Through this cumulative density function, demand for each product can be defined.  
  The consumer surplus function is likely to be concave in quality. Consumption of 
agricultural products in general and beef in particular is usually accompanied by a great 
deal of secondary process in the home after purchase.   A higher quality cut of meat will 
be used as a steak whereas a lower cut may be stewed or heavily seasoned.    Uncertainty 
in quality results in sub-optimal uses of the meat at home.  For this reason, the expected 
utility from consumption under uncertain quality is less than the utility under certain 
θ  Qi
α - Pi     if a consumer purchases a product with quality Qi at 
         price Pi 
0              if the consumer does not purchase a good.   15 
quality.  Moreover, several studies
9 report that inconsistency in quality is a key consumer 
FRPSODLQW￿ )RU WKHVH UHDVRQV￿ , UHVWULFW . WR EH EHWZHHQ ￿ DQG ￿￿ 
 Solving for demand in the two good case yields:  
 








   
where Z represents the total number of consumers in the market.  
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Note that in the n-good case, a proportion of consumers, those with θ  less than  n n Q P /,   
do not purchase any product.   This occurrence can be resolved for purposes of estimation 
by constraining θ  to be greater than
α
n n Q P / .   The restriction assures that the consumers 
who purchase a good have a positive consumer surplus.   
Contract theory informs us that stability in purchasing decisions requires that two 
properties be satisfied.  First, the individual rationality constraint requires that consumers 
only purchase a product if it yield them a surplus in excess of their reservation surplus 
which is assumed to be zero in this model.   Second, the incentive compatibility 
constraint specifies that consumers only pick the product that yields him the highest 
possible consumer surplus.  If the either of these constraints are not satisfied the 
consumer will unilaterally deviate from their product choice.  Contract theory informs us 
that a mechanism (a price-quality offer) satisfies these constraints if and only if being 
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truthful (with regard to the agent’s true θ ) provides every agent at least as much utility as 
any misrepresentation of it.  
The individual rationality constraint is satisfied through the definition of demand.  
In the case of the n
th good, the consumer surplus is zero for the marginal consumer.  For 
all consumers with higher marginal valuations of quality the consumer surplus must be 
greater than zero.  Since any consumer with a higher marginal valuation of quality than 
the marginal consumer of the n
th good can always pretend to have a lower valuation of 
quality than they actually do have and pick the n
th good, all consumers who purchase 
must receive a non-negative surplus.    
 It can be shown that the first and second order conditions for incentive 
compatibility are: 
  
The second order constraint is satisfied if the Spence-Mirlees
10 condition is satisfied.  
This condition is:  
 
By construction, my model assumes imposes this condition to satisfy the second order 
condition.  The first order condition defines the prices that producers are able to charge 
for a product of a given quality.  This condition basically indicates that the increase in 
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θ  17 
the increase in utility provided with the higher quality given to higher quality types.  The 
first order condition defines the maximum price increase that may accompany a quality 
increase.  
    
IV.B.  Demand under Uncertainty in Quality 
Whereas the simple model of vertical differentiation assumes that consumers have 
perfect information on product quality, in many agricultural goods, this is not the case. 
Exact product quality can not be guaranteed for a product due to production error, quality 
measurement or a non-integrated supply structure.   Instead, in the case of graded 
products, quality is measured to be within a specific set of bounds and even those broad 
measures of quality are subject to measurement error.   Imperfect grading allows the 
possibility of grading errors where a product being placed in grade when its quality does 
not fall within those grading bounds.  Over-grading occurs when products are ranked 
higher than their actual quality while under-grading is when they are ranked lower. Over-
grading errors offer the consumer unexpected benefits while under-grading errors provide 
unexpected costs. 
Since quality is uncertain, consumers are modeled as expected consumer surplus 
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This specification does not change the substantive aspects of the demand model.  Instead, 
it merely limits the direct of the mechanism with which producers could ultimately 
                                                                                                                                                                     
10 This condition is also known as the sorting condition and the single –crossing condition in the literature. 
θ  E[Qi
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         price Pi 
0              if the consumer does not purchase a good.   18 
influence product quality.  Provided the first and second order conditions of the incentive 
compatibility and individual rationality constraints are met, product demand will be: 
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7KH VROXWLRQV IRU ￿ LQ WKH IRXU JRRG FDVH DUH￿  
  θ 1 =  (P1-P2)/(E[Q
α |G1]- E[Q
α |G2]) 
  θ 2 =  (P2-P3)/( E[Q
α |G2]- E[Q
α |G3]) 
  θ 3 =  (P3-P4)/( E[Q
α |G3]- E[Q
α |G4]) 
θ 4 =  (P4)/( E[Q
α |G4]) 
Grading errors may lower or raise consumer expectations of the underlying 
expected utility provided by each grade.   Intuition suggests and the empirical literature 
shows that price of low value goods increases and high values decreases when grading 
error increases.  In a general equilibrium setting, as the equilibrium price changes, the 
boundaries on θ  for the consumers who purchase in the predetermined quality range also 
change. Consider Figure 4 briefly.  This graph shows how the θ i's are a dependent on 
prices and quality levels for each product.  It is a relatively easy extension to show that 
the same process holds when consumers are expected surplus maximizers with the 
exception that instead of prices and expected quality are now at issue.   When grading 
error is introduced the slopes of the consumers surplus lines change.  At the lowest 
quality level, the lines gets steeper and at the highest quality level, the lines get flatter. 
The effects on the intermediate grades are indeterminant.   Changes in the slopes of these 
lines necessarily causes the θ i's to adjust in the absence of price changes.   19 
This specification itself is problematic, however, because the distribution of θ  
determines the market share for each product.  Since expected quality and the distribution 
of θ  is exogenous in this model, only prices can adjust to equate supply and demand.  The 
presence of grading errors can potentially influence the expected quality of each grade 
making the problem complicated much more quickly.   Knowing the distribution of θ  
however, allows an equilibrium set of prices to be determined if the likelihood of grading 
error decreases.    
 
IV.C Estimation 
  In order to estimate the effect of grading error on prices, I will proceed in the 
several steps listed below. 
1.)  Assume a set of . utility parameters that will be used in a 1
st step estimation of 
the consumer utility in the consumer surplus function.  The form of the utility 
should ensure that the Spence-Mirlees condition is satisfied and that consumers 
are risk averse in quality.    For this reason, I suggest a utility function of the 
VLPSOH IRUP 8 ￿4
. ZLWK . EHLQJ EHWZHHQ ￿ DQG ￿￿ 
2.)  Specify a structure for the distribution of quality within a grade. The choice of the 
error structure is specific to shape of the data on hand. In CJLS paper, prunes size 
within each grade is estimated with a Gamma distribution as grading error is 
known to be asymmetric a priori.  7KH IXQFWLRQ J￿4_￿i;Gi) is the probability of get 
TXDOLW\ 4 JLYHQ WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ SDUDPHWHUV ￿i in grade Gi.    
3.)  (VWLPDWH ￿i foU HDFK JUDGH￿ (VWLPDWLQJ ￿i will obviously require an independent 
test other than that used in grading.  With regard to the beef industry, tenderness 
may be a sufficient metric for quality.  Meat science data may be sufficient to   20 
estimate tenderness values as several studies have estimated the distribution of 
quality within meat grades using the WBS method. Calculate E[Q
._￿i,Gi,Bi] for 
each grade. 
4.)  &DOFXODWH ￿i boundaries based on the expected quality qualities in step 6 and 
observed prices. 
5.)  Estimate a distribution of F(θ ) using the observed θ  boundaries and the market 
shares. 
 
Starting from a distribution of θ , general equilibrium dynamics can be estimated.   For 
example, reductions in the variance of quality for a given product will raise its expected 
utility, thereby increasing the price it may charge for any given effect on expected quality     
 
IV.4 Summary 
This paper provides a method of estimating the distribution of consumer tastes 
with regard to quality.  From that distribution estimates to the changes in prices can occur 
in a general equilibrium setting.  The changes in prices from a reduction in grading errors 
can be estimated when the variance of quality within a grade decreases.  The immediate 
effect of reductions in the variance of quality is that it increases expected quality for that 
product increases.   This model may be especially useful for analyzing the effect of 
tighter grading standards for the highest quality brand since competition is only one-sided 
in that case.   
Branded beef products are being introduced to address specific concerns 
regarding the degree of quality assurance provided by the USDA grading standards.  The 
certification and process verification programs that have arisen over the last decade are   21 
aimed at improving the average quality and reducing the variance in quality to improve 
beef prices and returns.  In light of the rapid adoption of such programs this paper 
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Figure 3. 
The Utility Curve assuming that grading errors  













Table 1. USDA Certification Programs 










Source: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service 




















Major U.S. Beef Breeds Ranked By Annual Registration Numbers (in Thousands)  
 Year   
Breed  1997  1995  1985  1985  1980  Year  Association Formed 
Angus 239.5  224.8  159  175.5  257.6  1883 
Hereford 105.6  112.9  170.5  180.0  353.2  1881 
Limousin 61.5  79.3 71.6 44.5 13.8  1968 
Beefmaster  56.6  47.1 38.4 32.1 30.0  1961 
Charolais 49.2 55  44.8 23.2  23  1957 
Simmental  35.7  30.0 15.4 12.0 12.5  1969 
Red  Angus  35.7  30.0 15.4 12.0 12.5  1954 
Gelbvieh  30.1  33.8 22.8 16.1  NA  1971 
Brangus  27.7  31.0 32.1 30.3 24.5  1949 
Shorthorn 15.5  20.0 18.0 16.7 19.4  1872 
Brahman  15.1  15.4 13.0 29.9 36.4  1924 
Source:  Taylor and Field 1999 
 
 












































θ 4                    θ 3                θ 2            θ 1 
CS = θ  Q1
α -P1 
In this model, the intersection points of 
the lines define the θ i which are the 
minimum θ  values required for a 
consumer to purchase a given price, 
quality bundle.  For example, θ 2 is 
equal to (P2-P3)/(Q2
α  -Q3










0 < α < 1 
θ 2 














Q4                         Q3                              Q2       Q1 
θ 1 
θ 4 
This graph depicts the CS surplus of four 
buyers of a vertically differentiation.   Market 
separation occurs as the single crossing 
property is satisfied in the consumer surplus 
function.  Consumers are offered four prices 
associated with a good varying over quality.  
For example, the P1, Q1 bundle is the highest 
priced, highest quality bundle.  Consumers 
who pick the    
Q 
Figure 5. 